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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 New York Law School’s symposium, Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from 
International Law and Policy, provided an important opportunity to consider the 
insights that the New Haven School of jurisprudence might yield with respect to 
some of the most important problems international law faces today. The purpose of 
the symposium—to consider possible solutions to pressing global problems—was 
ambitious, but this ambition both reflects and exemplifies the New Haven School.
 The New Haven School is a methodological approach that views law as a process 
of authoritative and controlling decisionmaking designed to promote human dignity 
and world order.1 Professor W. Michael Reisman’s keynote address provided an 
overview of the foundational premises of the New Haven School.2 In this essay, I 
would like to add some thoughts about what the New Haven School has meant to 
me as an international human rights scholar and advocate. I would also like to 
highlight principles of the New Haven School approach as reflected in the discussions 
that took place at the symposium.
ii. thE nEW haVEn sChOOL
 There are several aspects of the New Haven School of international law that have 
always struck me as particularly important. First, the policy-oriented approach of the 
New Haven School is a constant reminder of the purpose of international law. Too 
often, lawyers view law as something that exists in and of itself, for its own sake. The 
New Haven School, in contrast, reminds us that law is a tool, and not just any tool, 
but a tool designed to promote human dignity and world public order.3 The approach 
of the New Haven School demands that we ask not only what international law is 
and how to make it work more effectively, but also what values and goals the law 
does and should vindicate. In other words, the New Haven School “start[s] from the 
premise that law should serve human beings,”4 and not the other way around. Law is 
not law for law’s sake, but rather law for the sake of all of us.
 Second, the fact that the New Haven School understands “policy” as part and 
parcel of “law” provides it with powerful explanatory and predictive force. By “policy” 
I mean consideration of the outcomes that would result given particular choices in 
the process of making and applying law. Clearly, the idea that there are choices to be 
made in this process and that decisionmakers should consider the consequences of 
their choices is not a new idea, nor is it one unique to the New Haven School. 
Nonetheless, in both practice and legal education, we continually tend to misconceive 
1. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman et al., The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 
575, 576 (2007).
2. W. Michael Reisman, Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., Keynote Address at the New York Law School 
Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and Policy 
(Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/z1eFgbDm2ig?t=1m2s. 
3. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order, in Myres S. McDougal & Assocs., Studies in World Public Order 3, 16 (1960).
4. Reisman et al., supra note 1, at 580.
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the concept of “law.” We misconceive law when we understand it, and present it to 
our students, as a set of norms that inexorably lead to particular conclusions when 
properly applied. Arguments about what the outcome should be—what policy we 
should adopt—are often relegated to a secondary status. Policy becomes a tool to be 
used in limited contexts, such as when faced with two different interpretations of a 
rule, but is otherwise viewed as having little authority.
 The New Haven School, in contrast, rejects distinctions between law and policy. 
As Professor Reisman has explained: “It is a truism that law is policy, but [the New 
Haven School] is an approach that is policy-oriented in a much broader sense. . . . It 
also undertakes to improve the performance of decision processes themselves and 
enhance their capacity to achieve outcomes more consonant with human dignity.”5 
Although condemned for this early on,6 the policy orientation of the New Haven 
School is in fact one of its greatest strengths. As a methodology, the School orients 
our attention to policies to be achieved; rather than an additional argument to 
supplement law, consideration of policy is an integral part of lawmaking itself. From 
the perspective of the New Haven School, outcomes are not the necessary 
consequences of rules but rather the product of choices we make in realizing the 
shared values of the community.
 Third, policy-oriented jurisprudence validates the importance of taking responsibility 
for one’s choices. Perhaps I focus on responsibility because I have two small children 
and am acutely conscious of trying to teach them to be responsible for their choices, but 
it is also the way I think about the law. In its understanding of law as a process of 
making choices that have consequences, the New Haven School requires us to take 
responsibility for the decisions we make as advisors and decisionmakers. In writing 
about the School, Professor Reisman has explained that “[f]rom the standpoint of the 
New Haven School, jurisprudence is a theory about making social choices.”7 Law is not 
something that happens to us, it is rather a product of our actions. Thus, one of the 
most innovative features of the New Haven School has been to flip the traditional 
inquiry of law, looking at law not as a body of rules that guide the individual but 
instead focusing on the decisionmaker and the tools he or she needs to address 
challenges of world public order.8 The New Haven School sees its role as explicitly 
assisting decisionmakers, not simply assessing and evaluating their actions.
5. Id. at 577.
6. Reisman, supra note 2.
7. W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 
Proc. 118, 120 (1992).
8. Reisman, supra note 2; see also W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 
108 Yale L.J. 935, 937 (1999) [hereinafter Reisman, Theory About Law] (“The Copernican Revolution 
in McDougal’s jurisprudence was in unseating rules as the mechanism of decision and installing the 
human being—all human beings, to varying degrees—as deciders.”).
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iii. sOLVing gLObaL prObLEMs
 The New Haven School’s approach was the organizing theme connecting the 
symposium’s panels and presentations. Each of the panels addressed a different aspect 
of the policy-oriented approach to lawmaking—actors, institutions, norms, and 
communication. Hari Osofsky’s environmental law research9 and the commentaries by 
Rebecca Bratspies10 and William Ascher11 focused on the actors involved in lawmaking. 
The international investment and trade law presentation by Diane Desierto,12 with 
commentaries by Tai-Heng Cheng13 and Robert Howse,14 considered the institutions 
that shape the processes of decisionmaking. Craig Hammer’s15 human rights law 
presentation, with commentaries by Ruti Teitel16 and Siegfried Wiessner,17 emphasized 
the importance of the role of legal norms and authority in the decisionmaking process. 
The use of force presentation by Jacob Katz Cogan and Monica Hakimi,18 with 
9. Hari M. Osofsky, Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Remarks at the New York Law School 
Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and Policy 
(Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/AmCj9FX0abc?t=1m58s.
10. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Professor of Law, City Univ. of N.Y. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the New York Law 
School Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and 
Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/AmCj9FX0abc?t=28m40s.
11. William Ascher, Professor of Gov’t & Econ., Claremont McKenna Coll., Remarks at the New York 
Law School Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law 
and Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/AmCj9FX0abc?t=53m36s.
12. Diane Desierto, Professor of Law, Peking Univ. Sch. of Transnat’l Law, Remarks at the New York Law 
School Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and 
Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/Y1QH7iu5PCA?t=2m1s. 
13. Tai-Heng Cheng, Partner, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Remarks at the New York Law 
School Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and 
Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/Y1QH7iu5PCA?t=30m37s. 
14. Robert Howse, Professor of Law, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the New York Law School Law 
Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and Policy (Apr. 
12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/Y1QH7iu5PCA?t=39m47s.
15. Craig Hammer, Consultant, The World Bank, Remarks at the New York Law School Law Review 
Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), 
available at http://youtu.be/lKFkLf8HiZg?t=49s. 
16. Ruti Teitel, Professor of Law, N.Y. Law Sch., Remarks at the New York Law School Law Review 
Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), 
available at http://youtu.be/lKFkLf8HiZg?t=1h1s. 
17. Siegfried Wiessner, Professor of Law, St. Thomas Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the New York Law 
School Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and 
Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/lKFkLf8HiZg?t=34m35s.
18. Jacob Katz Cogan, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cincinnati, & Monica Hakimi, Professor of Law, Univ. of 
Mich., Remarks at the New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: 
Perspectives from International Law and Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/_-
MaxkcMVo8?t=2m46s.
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commentaries by Mahnoush Arsanjani,19 William Burke-White,20 and Nicholas 
Rostow,21 illustrated lawmaking as a process of communication and the distinction 
between myth and code in the context of the prohibition on the use of force. 
 A. Actors
 One of the defining characteristics of the New Haven School is its pluralistic 
account of the actors and interests that drive decisionmaking on international issues. 
Understanding the participants involved and their interests and resources is a central 
part of the New Haven School’s approach to the process of decisionmaking. 
Moreover, the New Haven School takes a broad view of the types of actors that 
should be factored into account, both those that have formal decisionmaking 
competence as well as those who influence decisions.22
 Building on these insights, Hari Osofsky’s article highlights the roles of substate 
actors—not only cities but also suburbs—in the process of lawmaking on climate 
change. She urges a model for global problem solving that is de-centered, in which 
the nation-state is only one of many actors involved in responding to the “wicked 
problem”23 of climate change. Professor Osofsky makes clear that we have to account 
for local actors not only in order to better understand what climate change responses 
look like, but also because these local actors can be an important source of learning. 
Her article encourages us to consider the characteristics of these suburban actors in 
order to understand what motivates actors to become involved in the process of 
responding to climate change.24
 Rebecca Bratspies takes up Professor Osofsky’s challenge to consider substate actors 
in creating solutions to global problems. She uses the metaphor of the lionfish to illustrate 
the complexity of the factors that have resulted in an explosion of lionfish in the Atlantic 
Ocean, resulting in the decimation of coral reefs there. Although deeply skeptical of our 
ability to truly solve these difficult problems, she also finds some grounds for optimism 
19. Mahnoush Arsanjani, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Remarks at the New York Law School Law Review 
Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), 
available at http://youtu.be/_-MaxkcMVo8?t=31m56s. 
20. William Burke-White, Professor of Law, Univ. of Penn. Law Sch., Remarks at the New York Law 
School Law Review Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and 
Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://youtu.be/_-MaxkcMVo8?t=20m5s. 
21. Nicholas Rostow, Professor, Nat’l Def. Univ., Remarks at the New York Law School Law Review 
Symposium: Solving Global Problems: Perspectives from International Law and Policy (Apr. 12, 2013), 
available at http://youtu.be/_-MaxkcMVo8?t=43m10s. 
22. This includes not only states but also “state officials, nongovernmental organizations, pressure groups, 
interest groups, gangs, and individuals, who act on behalf of all other participants and on their own.” 
Reisman, supra note 7, at 122; see also McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 3, at 12.
23. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Solving Global Environmental Problems: Reflections on Polycentric 
Efforts to Address Climate Change, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 771, 778 n.4 (2013–2014) (citing Richard J. 
Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 
Cornell L. Rev. 1153 (2009)). 
24. See generally id.
924
Reflections on the new haven school NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
in the efforts of actors other than states and international organizations in tackling these 
issues—including certification schemes that leverage consumer buying power and 
localized responses such as “lionfish derbies.”25 William Ascher also emphasizes the wide 
variety of authoritative actors involved in responding to climate change—ranging from 
counties in California to nongovernmental organizations.26 Professor Ascher asks whether 
state and international actors could embrace the work of these other participants and 
foster both cooperation and competition.27
 B. Institutions
 Diane Desierto’s presentation on international trade and investment law reflected 
several important features of the New Haven School of jurisprudence. First, in 
arguing against efforts to unify the fields of investment and trade law—and, in 
particular, to marry understandings of public interest in trade and investment—she 
brought an important focus on institutions not just as passive vessels or artifacts of an 
international system, but as “products of an ongoing constitutive process.”28 Second, 
Professor Desierto applied the New Haven School’s phase analysis29 to institutions 
and considered the way in which the particular features and design of the investment 
and trade regimes affect the opportunities and resources available to participants and 
the kinds of decisions they are able to make.30 Consistent with the New Haven 
School’s orientation on outcomes, her presentation also reminds us that just because 
something is possible does not mean it is right. She argues that we should be skeptical 
about the desirability of incorporating trade law into the investment regime given the 
World Trade Organization’s less-than-stellar record in protecting human rights.31
25. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Lionfish as a Metaphor for Governance in an Era of Climate Change, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. 
L. Rev. 829, 851–54 (2013–2014). 
26. William Ascher, Expanding the “Geography” of Policy Options to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A 
Commentary on Hari Osofsky’s The Geography of Solving Global Environmental Problems, 58 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 859, 864–67 (2013–2014).
27. See generally id. at 872–73.
28. Reisman, Theory About Law, supra note 8, at 937.
29. W. Michael Reisman, A New Haven Look at Sanctions, 95 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 27, 27 (2001) 
(explaining that phase analysis “allows the observer to gather and organize data about the participants, 
their perspectives, the situations of interaction, the bases of power on which participants draw, the 
strategic modalities by which they manipulate those power bases, and the aggregate outcomes of 
decisions, examined in terms of power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect, and 
rectitude”); see also Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 362, 387–88 (1971).
30. The New Haven School’s approach considers the decisionmaking process “in terms of those who engage 
in it (the participants), the subjective dimensions that animate them (their perspectives), the situations 
in which they interact, the resources upon which they draw, the ways they manipulate those resources 
and the aggregate outcomes of the process of interaction, which are conceived in terms of a comprehensive 
set of values.” Reisman, supra note 7, at 121–22.
31. Desierto, supra note 12.
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 Tai-Heng Cheng’s and Robert Howse’s comments oriented our thinking toward 
the importance of context.32 They emphasized differences in the policy goals of the 
trade versus the investment regimes. Dr. Cheng cautioned against using norms across 
these regimes because doing so would be contrary to the intentions of the parties.33 
In his comments, Professor Howse focused on the idea of law as a process of 
communication and ongoing interpretation. He rejected both the approach of 
unification and the approach of self-contained regimes, arguing in favor of dynamic 
integration involving dialogue, adjustment, and accommodation. For Professor 
Howse, legal interpretations that originate in other regimes could certainly be 
relevant elsewhere as long as there is an awareness of context in the process.34
 C. Norms
 Craig Hammer and Winston Nagan’s article is a fascinating case study of the role 
of legal norms in the process of authoritative decisionmaking.35 Their article uses the 
problem of indigenous control over land—specifically the case of the Shuar in 
Ecuador—to consider the role that law has played in the relationship of indigenous 
peoples to their land. The article notes, for example, the way in which the Ecuadorian 
Constitution simultaneously threatened and provided an avenue for protecting that 
relationship. Law has been both empowering and disempowering for the Shuar, 
providing special protections but also rendering the protection of law more difficult. 
The Shuar have also used legal articulations as resources to further augment and 
strengthen their respective positions, creating, for example, their own legal norms by 
claiming their rights in a Bill of Fundamental Rights36 that outlines their rights to 
their land, natural resources, and indigenous knowledge.
 Siegfried Wiessner’s comments emphasized the role of the authority signal in the 
lawmaking process. Authority “is the structure of expectation concerning who, with 
what qualifications and mode of selection, is competent to make which decisions by 
what criteria and what procedures.”37 The “authority signal” is the “extent to which, 
empirically, the processes generating [a] norm and the symbols attached to it convey a 
sense of legitimacy or propriety to the normative communication’s recipients.”38 Both 
32. See generally Tai-Heng Cheng, Preface: Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Contemporary American Legal 
Education, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 771 (2013–2014); see also Howse, supra note 14.
33. Cheng, supra note 13. 
34. Howse, supra note 14.
35. See generally Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Conceptual and Jurisprudential Aspects of Property 
in the Context of the Fundamental Rights of Indigenous People: The Case of the Shuar of Ecuador, 58 N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 875 (2013–2014). 
36. Bill of Fundamental Rights (2002) (Shuar Fed’n, Ecuador) (on file with Winston P. Nagan, the 
drafter of the Bill). Nagan also coauthored an article that appears in this issue of the New York Law 
School Law Review. See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 35.
37. McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 3, at 13.
38. Robert D. Sloane, More Than What Courts Do: Jurisprudence, Decision, and Dignity—In Brief Encounters 
and Global Affairs, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 517, 520–21 (2009). 
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authority signal and control intention are needed for a communication to constitute 
law,39 but the level of each for prescription to be effective depends on the context.40 
Using the example of a recent resolution by the International Law Association’s 
Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which he chaired, Professor 
Wiessner emphasized that the considerable authority signal of this resolution was a 
function of both by whom and how the decision was made. Although formally a 
resolution by an international nongovernmental organization without binding effect, 
it was made by a highly respected body that ref lected diverse legal traditions.41 
Moreover, the resolution was passed without objection and with near consensus, with 
only one abstention on nonsubstantive grounds.42 The authority of this resolution43 is 
particularly important given the advances it makes in articulating the content of the 
rights possessed by indigenous peoples.44
 Ruti Teitel’s comments focused on the normative significance of collectivities 
organized along ethnic lines and the way in which claims by and on behalf of peoples 
can have constitutive effect. Tracing the tension between claims of belonging and the 
protection of borders, Professor Teitel argued that “humanity’s law” requires 
vindication of the rights of both individuals and groups. Her comments and her 
larger work on “humanity’s law”45 share the New Haven School’s deep and abiding 
concern with decisionmaking in the community’s common interest46 and the role of 
individuals as members of a global community.
39. See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 
Proc. 101, 111–12 (1981).
40. See id. at 112.
41. See Siegfried Wiessner, The State and Indigenous Peoples: The Historic Significance of ILA Resolution No. 
5/2012, in Der Staat im Recht, Festschrift für Eckart Klein zum 70. Geburtstag 1368 (M. 
Breuer et al. eds., 2013) (observing that International Law Association resolutions have been recognized 
as ref lecting customary law, and stating that “global resolutions of a body as qualified and diverse as the 
International Law Association are stating a rare consensus amongst, at times, radically different cultures 
and value traditions, and thus should be especially appreciated and valued”). 
42. See id. at 1364 (stating that the abstention was by a committee member who arrived late to the discussion 
and did not feel sufficiently well versed in the substance of the matter to take a position on the resolution).
43. Int’l Law Ass’n, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Res. 5/2012 (Aug. 30, 2012).
44. See id. ¶¶ 1, 4–6, 10 (recognizing, inter alia, collective human rights and providing important elaboration 
on the rights of self-determination; autonomy; free, prior and informed consent; and reparation and redress).
45. Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (2011).
46. The New Haven School views lawmaking as “a process of authoritative decision by which the members 
of a community clarify and secure their common interests.” 1 Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. 
McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy, at xxi 
(1992). The School evidences “a preference for inclusivity in the clarification of the common interest 
and the rejection of special interests redefining the community interests.” Winston P. Nagan & Aitza 
M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 13 San Diego Int’l L.J. 429, 517 (2012).
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 D. Communication
 Jacob Katz Cogan and Monica Hakimi’s presentation on the norms governing 
the use of force exemplified the methodology of the New Haven School with its 
disregard for labels and its focus on the actions and signals of authoritative 
decisionmakers within the relevant community. Drawing on concepts of the “myth 
system” and “operational code,”47 Professors Cogan and Hakimi observed that, with 
respect to norms governing the use of force, there are two sets of rules. The first is 
what they call a “formal code,” the output of formal decisionmaking processes that 
regulate the use of force, while the second is an “informal code” that has developed 
through the practice of states. These two codes push in different directions: the 
formal code constrains the use of force, while the informal code deregulates and 
sanctions its use. Although they recognized that deviation from formal norms is not 
a unique occurrence, they argued that the informal code is no longer simply tolerated 
but indeed is increasingly recognized and defended as legal.48
 Professors Cogan and Hakimi’s recognition of the informal code as authoritative and 
their identification of changes in state responses to conduct inconsistent with the formal 
code resonates with the New Haven School’s approach to law, not as a set of formal 
institutions and rules, but as a process of communication. This process of communication 
is comprised of three streams—policy content, authority signal, and control intention—
and the communication that fulfills these functions is law.49 Policy content refers to 
communication of the substance of the norm—“the extent to which a norm communicates 
a directive or prohibition: ‘thou shalt’ or ‘thou shalt not.’”50 Authority signal is the extent 
to which that norm is communicated in a way that is perceived as legitimate or proper by 
the recipients.51 Finally, control intention refers to the recipient’s perception of the 
likelihood of enforcement—“the extent to which those recipients expect that those with 
effective power will invest sufficient resources to make the norm effective.”52 The 
examples Professors Cogan and Hakimi discuss all indicate communication reflecting 
particular content concerning the use of force (albeit with differing levels of clarity), 
generally with an authority signal, but often with weak control intention. The question 
this raises is whether a weakened control intention has, over time, undermined the norm 
47. A “myth system” is a system of formal legal norms, while an “operational code” is “a set of norms that 
operate in a certain sector and that actors deem to be authoritative even though the norms may be 
inconsistent with formal legal codes.” W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational Code of 
Competence, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 777, 777 n.3 (1989). In other words, in a given area, the myth system is 
the normative system that “is supposed to apply and which continues to enjoy lip service among elites,” 
while the operational code is the normative system “that is actually applied.” W. Michael Reisman, 
Myth System and Operational Code, 3 Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord. 229, 230 (1976–1977). Elsewhere, 
Professors Reisman, Wiessner, and Willard characterize the distinction as one between “the law-in-the-
books” and “the law-in-action.” See Reisman et al., supra note 1, at 577.
48. Cogan & Hakimi, supra note 18.
49. Reisman, supra note 39, at 108.
50. Sloane, supra note 38, at 520.
51. See id. at 520–21; see also supra text accompanying note 38.
52. Sloane, supra note 38, at 521.
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such that in some contexts it has become more of an “expression of morality”—something 
that perhaps ought to be done, but which is not law.53 Thus, their case study of changing 
state practice in the area of use of force provided an important example of the New 
Haven School’s understanding of law as a process of communication.
 William Burke-White offered a very “New Haven” response to Professors Cogan 
and Hakimi’s presentation, deconstructing their deconstruction, pushing back on the 
formalism of the labels they chose to characterize these two sets of norms. He challenged 
both whether there are in fact two codes as well as the labels of “formal” and “informal,” 
suggesting instead that the “formal” category is really concerned with judicially 
constructed interpretation of formal code, while “informal” is comprised of state practice 
and opinio juris. His comments provided an important reorientation of the participants 
involved in the process of communication, and he suggested that the real divergence 
between the two categories of norms is the participants involved in each.
 Mahnoush Arsanjani similarly turned our attention to the role of various actors 
in safeguarding and upholding the sanctity of the myth system, acknowledging that 
the formal code is based on premises that have since become obsolete, namely that 
states have a monopoly on the use of force. In light of new realities, with nonstate 
actors increasingly acting in this area and the International Court of Justice and the 
U.N. Security Council having fewer and fewer opportunities to manage lawmaking, 
it is important to consider new actors, such as the International Criminal Court, as 
possible custodians of the myth system.
 Nicholas Rostow’s comments offered a pragmatic take on this discussion and a 
continued emphasis on the participants in the lawmaking process. He argued that 
the multiplicity of actors involved in lawmaking today presents both a challenge and 
a hope. Although the involvement of many participants makes it more difficult to 
reach agreement, it is only through a multiplicity of actors that we will find solutions 
to some of the most challenging problems we face today.
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 The discussions at the symposium and the articles written in connection with it 
offer several insights about the New Haven School and its policy-oriented approach. 
First, complexity is good, at least with respect to the participants in the lawmaking 
process. We need everyone on board to even begin to solve these pressing global 
problems. Second, law is messy. The challenge for us as participants and advisors is 
to recognize the existence of multiple and often conflicting codes and to employ 
them in ways that further the common interest. Third, dialogue helps. One of the 
goals of a system featuring a multiplicity of actors and institutions should be to create 
a framework for continued conversation and dialogue. This symposium was an 
excellent contribution to that dialogue, and I thank the organizers and the participants 
for providing me with an opportunity to take part in this conversation.
53. Reisman, supra note 39, at 112 (explaining that it would be “improper to call [an expression of morality—
content without control intention] . . . law unless, in the hypothetically possible but extremely rare case, 
the target audience is so enchanted or enthralled by the particular authority mystique that control 
intention is either unnecessary, or may be deemed to have ultimately been created”).
